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Abstract
Communication research requires data that are rich enough to contain
explicit evidence about processes of communication.
The paper fonnally distinguishes among and discusses three kinds of
data: aggregational data (such as accumulated in much of psychological
inquiries, small group experiments and survey research) and network data
(representing observable patterns of interest to relational biology and sociology, for example) are found to be not rich enough to qualify as commWTll£..
cation data proper.
The paper describes an elementary form of communication data that
would contain explicit evidence about the process in question. It exposes
some conceptual degenerations in communication research as a consequence
of heavy reliance on inadequate data. Pointing to the fact that the advancement of knowledge is critically linked to the ability to process a certain kind
of data, the paper concludes that communication research must develop
new analytical techniques that are compatible with its most basic concept:
communication.

In the field of communication research there exists considerable confusion regarding appropriate investigative methods.
Assertions about the importance of communication processes for
the functioning of society and individual well being cannot provide a logical basis for inquiries into the phenomena, nor can they
define disciplinary boundaries. As part of a larger methodological
concern, this paper is concerned with the nature of data relevant
or irrelevant to inquiries into communication processes. It will be
argued that the form of communication data is fundamentally
different from much of traditional behavioral science data. This
presents a unique analytical challenge which needs an appropriate
response.
Klaus Krippendorff (Ph.D., University of Illinois) is associate Professor at
The Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania. His
current interest lies in the methodology of communication research, particularly of content analysis and of applying cybernetic models to social
processes.
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The role of data in scientific inquiries

The Role of Data in Scientific Inquiries
The concept of "data" as used in this paper may be elucidated
with the help of the diagram in Figure 1. The upper part of the
diagram is adapted from Coombs' A Theary 01 Data [11:4], Here
it is suggested that, as a first step, the behavioral scientist must
decide on the observations to which attention is to be paid. These
observations are not yet data, however.
In a second step, observations have to be formalized, i.e., they
have to be identified, labeled, classified, measured or "translated"
into terms amenable to subsequent analysis. This step is often
referred to as the making of fundamental measurements [2.0], as
data-making [32] or as recording. It should be pointed out that
the outcome of this step-data-cannot be considered objective in
the usual sense of the word. In deciding what is relevant to an
investigative problem and how observations are structured and
assigned to the formal terms of an analysis, the nature of data
reflects the scientist's orientation and values.
The third step in the diagram involves the detection of relationships, order and structure in data and produces explicit evidence
for inferential classifications. Evidence of this kind follows as a
logical consequence of the data and of the assumptions that are
implicit in the analytical procedure. Usually, there are many ways
of analyzing data and the choice among techniques for transforming data into evidence must be justified in the light of the
scientist's analytical objectives.
Scientific inquiries often involve a fourth step at which deductively derived evidence is inductively related to potential
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observations. Analytical procedures, it should be pointed out,
operate exclusively on what might be called syntactical structures
which are manifest in the formal terms of data. Evidence should
represent such structures in a theoretically meaningful way. In
contrast, this fourth step might be said to provide a semantic interpretation of evidence in the sense that the terms in which the
evidence appears are assigned significations and denotations. The
distinction between analysis and interpretation is important because only the former can be conclusive in the strict logical sense.
The latter always involves some uncertainty, nonverifiable assumptions, and guesswork.
As Coombs has noted, the behavioral scientist enters each of
these steps in a creative way in the sense that alternatives are
exhausted by him and his decisions will significantly determine
the results obtained from the analysis. Thus the universe of available events can be the same for a large number of disciplines, but
what is observed and what is extracted from it may be quite different depending on (a) the researcher's analytical objectives, (b)
his theoretical commitments, and (c) the investigative tools available to him. For example, a psycholo.gist may stndy society as a
statistical aggregate of individual properties; a sociologist might
consider the same as a network of roles, while a biolo.gist would
perhaps analyze his o.bservations in organismic terms.
The lower part of the diagram in Figure 1 suggests a bypass of
the explicit analysis. Intuitive conceptnalizations that may have
been formed directly from observatio.ns can control the research
results to. a more or less significant degree. Judgments regarding
"face validity" exemplify such a case. However, truly critical
sitnations arise where the research results are claimed to be supported by evidence that canno.t be derived from data by explicit
techniques. In such cases uncontro.lled info.rmation must have
entered the semantic interpretation surreptitiously. This need
not result from dishonest intentions. Rather, such situations may
stem from a confusion of explicit evidence with a semantic interpretation thereo.f. And this confusion may stem from a lack of
understanding of the fo.rmal nature of data, and particularly of the
kind of evidence that can or cannot be deduced from available
data.
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A cQmparison Qf the informational content of a string of symbols, such as the words in a natural language with a frequency
characterization of the symbQls in this string, provides an obvious
example. A frequency distribution can be derived from this string
in a logically determinate way. However, the operation cannot
be reversed without supplying informatiQn about the Qrder relationships among thQse symbQls. If someQne claims to. have studied
the grammar of a language from data that consisted of nothing
but word cQunts, the internal validity of the analytical process is
in question o.n the ground that the data base is insufficient and
hidden infQrmation must have entered the process somewhere.
It is PQssible to. ascertain, on purely formal grounds, whether
data can answer given questions, i.e., whether or not the data base
of an inquiry is rich enQugh to. contain relevant information. Decisions of this kind presuppose that the co.ncepts for which evidence is SQught are describable formally or syntactically. If the
form o.f data is such that it canno.t be mapped (in the mathematical sense) onto the form of the desired evidence (corresponding
to the co.ncepts under consideration) then the structure Qf the
data is inadequate, and can be rejected as irrelevant to. the desired
evidence.

The Notion of "Communication Process"
Several books and a large number of articles devote at least
part of their discussion to hQW communication can be apprehended intuitively. A review of such cQncepts goes beyo.nd the
SCQpe Qf this paper. Let it merely be stated here that some authors
consider it a prQcess by means of which Qne mind affects another
[23]; some writers assign crucial importance to. "messages" as
mediators between communication agents [16]; and others identify it as the fabric Qf society Dr as the web that holds any kind Df
organization tDgether [3, 12,36]. When a group Qf people talk to
each Dther, it is usually assumed that cDmmunicatiDn is taking
place. But schQlars disagree considerably as to whether a mutual
understanding is a necessary prerequisite for deciding whether
communication had occurred. The audible exchanges amQng
animals that facilitate cODrdination of their sDcial interaction can
alSo. be regarded as communication processes. Here the Qbjections
come from scholars with anthroprocentric attitudes who wish to
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limit such processes to inter-human activities. Similar controversies exist regarding the criterion of intentionality. The transmission of values and behavior patterns from generation to
generation is mown to be essential to the maintenance of a
culture's identity beyond the biological life of its carriers. Formally similar is the transmission of genetic information from
parents to offspring. It is difficult to see why the former process
is often regarded as one of communication while the latter is
rarely so interpreted in the social sciences. In both cases, ultimate
receivers are difficult to determine and the imputation of purpose
is doubtful.
Most of these debates are irrelevant to a theory of data. As
stated above, in order to recognize communication processes in
data, it is imperative that the intuitive concept of communication
be explicated and stated in an appropriate technical language.
Intuitively meaningful references to man, animals or machines or
to the channels among them may guide the behavioral scientist's
choice of observations. But such references cannot influence the
evidence that data can provide unless they are themselves formalized and take their pJace in the form of data.
Elsewhere I have argued for a syntactical definition of communication. It seems that the only reasonable delineation of the
empirical domain of the social communication sciences stems
from a theoretical commitment, i.e., a commitment regarding the
form of objectifications (theories, models, etc.) of real world
events. Communication sciences do not characteristically view
their objects as things or as combinations of properties, but as
patterns of dynamic interdependencies. The theoretical commitment underlying the various approaches to communication research seems reflected in the understanding of "communication'
as a process of tramsmission of structure among the pa:rts of a
system which are identifiable in time and space [22].
Such a formulation can readily be put into a mathematical form
which can in tum be searched for in adequate data. It can also be
given a variety of semantic interpretations thus showing it to be
sufficiently general. The "systems" may be biological, cognitive
or social in nature. The "structures" transmitted may involve
genetic, linguistic or cultural patterns of meaning. The notion of
"process" subsumes that of behavior or changes over time. "Trans-
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Figure 2
Evidence provided by minimum and rich communication data

mission" implies information exchange and control over geographic distances. The emphasis on transmission "among the
parts" directs attention to the complex fabric that integrates individual behaviors into organized wholes rather than to the nature
of a system's individualized components.

Communication Data
The task of communication research is presumably one of providing conclusive evidence about the parameters according to
which the process may be explained, predicted and/or controlled.
However, there are virtually no limitations as to the number and
kind of parameters that might be considered relevant for this purpose. Consequently, there is no upper limit as to the informational
richness that communication data may exhibit. But there is a
lower limit below which data remain meaningless as far as communication constructs are concerned. This seems to provide a
more reasonable definitional criterion of communication data:
communication data must provide explicit evidence at least about
the existence or non-existence of communication processes. Figure 2 depicts the evidence that minimum communication data
and, what might be called, "rich" communication data respectively provide. The analysis of minimum communication data
merely involves a decision with two outcomes. The analysis of
rich communication data may involve a large number of decisions
regarding which of the possible parameters provides the best account of the process manifested in data. Evidently, making choices
among the parameters of communication presupposes decisions
regarding the presence of the process. Thus rich communication
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data fully include the evidence that minimum communication
data contain.
With this very rough framework in mind it is now possible to
consider three kinds of data and ask in each case whether they can
provide evidence for communication processes as defined.
AGGREGATIONAL DATA

The F()/"m of Aggregational Data
In the sciences dealing with man, by far the most elaborate
analytical methods are used in psychology. Here the basic theoretical commitment lies in the assumption that human behavior
can be understood as a response to both environmental stimuli
and characteristics of the individual, his personality for example.
In addition, psychological schemes of explanation exhibit a
minimum concern for the intervening physiological mechanisms
[2]. Data that are gathered with these commitments in mind
usually exhibit the following form:
( 1) There is either one set A or two distinct sets A and B of
observations.
( 2) Each member of the set is described in terms of. ( classified
or scaled along) one or more dimensions x, i.e., A C IIxr
and/or Be IIxs.
(3) One kind of binary relation is specified between a collection of pairs of observations, i.e., d( at,aj) or d( at,b j ) where
d is either an order relation or a distance, aeA, beB.
This is essentially Coombs' [11] analysis, which he developed in
much greater detail than is required here.
Among the many semantic interpretations that can be given to
aggregational data are the following examples: a set of individuals are asked to judge the appearance of a set of mass circulation
magazines along semantic differential scales. Such scales constitute what Osgood et al. [27] call a semantic space, and distances
between pairs of points are presumed to be indicative of effective
similarities.
In experimental settings in which subjects are asked to indicate
their preference between television shows, consumer products or
works of art, individual responses specify an order relation be-
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tween pairs of stimuli. Similarly, answers to such questions as
the extent to which a subject desires to continue watching a
violent movie or the extent of disapproval of a political candidate
specify proximity relations between pairs of observations, concepts or individuals. Distances of this sort define a psychological
space in which data may be represented as points.
It is important to note that observations are recorded and
treated as collections (involving no inherent order) that define
statistical distributions in point spaces. The analysis of such data
invariably involves an aggregation, a statistical summation of
individual cases. The recorded responses of a number of individuals to a set of political speeches may be used to classify the individuals involved or to group the speeches to which each was
exposed. They may yield a simpler description of stimulus material involving fewer factors, or they may produce variables that
best predict how individuals react to speeches of a certain kind.
In either case the result is an aggregation of many responses by
many individuals to many speeches.
The Scope of Aggregational Data

A few quite different semantic interpretations of aggregational
data exhibit an extremely wide scope: the correlations between a
variety of daily habits and the occurrence of cancer are based on
aggregational data. The changes of stock market prices in response to political crises, the co-occurrence of riots with warm
weather and other environmental factors, the effects of fertilizers
on the growth of grain under a variety of climatic conditions,
etc.-all are based on the aggregation of a large number of observaf;ions that are scaled or categorized along many dimensions and
between which not more than binary relations are specified. Evidently, when aggregational data are stripped of their particular
semantic interpretation, there is nothing peculiarly human or
peculiarly psychological about it. It is in this sense that data are
regarded here in syntactical terms and as objects of mathematics.
Similarly the mode of analysis is independent of what the data
may represent.
While aggregational data exhibit a wide scope they also have
severe limitations: not all phenomena can be captured when data
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are viewed as collections of the characteristics of individuals,
stimuli, responses, etc. As Barton put it with reference to survey
research in sociology:
" ... using random sampling of individuals, the survey is a sociological
meat grinder, tearing the individual from his social context and
guaranteeing that nobody in the study interacts with anyone else in it
It is a little like a biologist putting his experimental animals through a
hamburger machine and looking at every hundredth cell through a
microscope; anatomy and physiology get lost; structure and function
disappear, and one is left with cell biology [7].

The same metaphor applies when designing psychological experiments or examining statistical records of large-scale phenomena. Whether individuals, diseases, telephone calls or riots are
aggregated, they must be regarded as independent of each other.
Where the generation of data can to some extent be controlled,
behavioral scientists take care to make sure that their units of
enumeration are independent in fact.
In his paper, Barton reviews attempts to bring social structure
"back in" survey data. Among the more prominent devices is to
record individuals' perception of interpersonal environments, to
request that sociometric choices be revealed, or to sample institutional settings and inter-institutional relationships. The intuitive link between social structure and the evidence that aggreg,ational data may provide lies in the postulated effect of such a
structure on its component parts: if such a structure has some
degree of reality then it would presumably be reflected in the
way individuals perceive each other or in the way inter-institutional relationships are distributed. For example, if there is
something to a social group as opposed to a collection of strangers,
sociometric choices among members should be expected to exhibit a non-random distribution. This is presumably the result of
how members work together, talk with each other, etc. It is on
the basis of such assumptions that aggregational data may become
indicative of possible dependencies among the aggregated units.
But these dependencies are not represented in such data.

Use and Limitations in Communication Research
Suppose a group of students is observed debating how to stage
a sit-in or whether to support a political candidate. No doubt
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we experience by any definition that members of this group
communicate with each other and we may observe the results of
such communication in the collective activities that follow. The
most common way of mapping such a situation into aggregational
data is to record what each individual receives and how he
responds to it. The data that would be generated in this case
come close to those of Bales [6].
It is not difficult to see that an aggregation of such data over the
individuals concerned is effectively equivalent to the generation
of data from experiments in which isolated individuals respond to
the stimuli presented. From such data alone it is impossible to
ascertain whether individuals were in fact communicating with
each other during the observation period or whether they behaved
in isolation. The behavior of isolated individuals or, more specifically, data that record the behavior of individuals as isolated
regardless of the social experimental setting (which mayor may
not include communication activities), cannot provide explicit
evidence for the existence of communication processes.
The situation would not change very much if attention were to
shift from the individuals that are connected through a communication net to their verbal exchanges. The collection of "who says
what to whom" or Newcomb's [26] co-orientation is only another
interpretation of the collection of "what causes X's response" or,
loosely, of stimulus-response connections. Both conform to the
formal characteristics of aggregational data. Both define point
distribution in multidimensional space in which distances may
become psychologically meaningful. Both permit a variety of
inferential classifications but neither contains evidence of the
dynamics of the process or of the network characteristics of these
exchanges. Aggregational data are simply inadequate to contain
evidence of communication processes. They do not satisfy the
minimum criteria for communication data.
What designates studies using such data as "communication
research" is not the kind of evidence it provides; rather, it is how
the results of such an analysis are interpreted semantically.
Often, it is the observer's assumed authority as a communication
researcher which leads him to decide whether the group members
are in fact communicating with each other and whether the stimulus is a communication. The uncertain observer may assure
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himself by asking the subjects if they felt that they did communicate. But such answers beg the question by not exhibiting what
goes on among the individuals rather than within each.
Yet, "communication research" flourishes despite its heavy
reliance on aggregational data and on analytical techniques that
are so conveniently geared to this kind of data. This is evident in
the literature on persuasion initiated by Hovland [19] and recently
reviewed by Sears and Abeles [29]; in the work done on infor~
mation diffusion [28]; in research into small groups phenomena
[15] including communication nets [30]; and in inquiries into
psycholinguistic processes [13], as well as in ahnost all the studies
in mass communication reviewed by Tannenbaum and Greenberg

[33].
The heavy use of aggregational data puts communication re~
search on extremely uncertain grounds. The fact that evidence of
communication processes cannot be deduced from such data has
caused another unfortunate development: severe conceptual impoverishment. If the intuitive and powerful notion of communication process is stripped of its relational qualities and processual
characteristics (as it is when aggregational data are generated),
then communication reduces to nothing but another variable.
Just as anxiety is thought to vary from low to high, attitudes are
scaled along dimensions such as strong-weak and violence is
measured in degrees, so is communication reduced to the more or
less of one or the other quality. This is indeed the common
denominator of most of the studies that are otherwise methodologically impeccable. The explanatory power of the notion of
"communication process" is then virtually eliminated. Blumer [8]
too observes inadequacies of sociological evidence relying on
aggregational data. He argues from a slightly different perspective that "modes of interpretation" cannot be described by "variables" and that researchers who force their observatioos into such
forms might not be able to tab the critical process intervening
between overtly obvious phenomena. In other words, communication can then not be regarded as a mediational phenomenon.
NETWORK DATA

The Form of Network Data
In contrast to the psychological focus on the behavior of indi-
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viduals taken as a whole, there is another research tradition
which is concerned with organizations involving individuals.
Theoretical commitments in sociology, political science and anthropology suggest expJaining the social behavior of groups and
their members in terms of the way individuals are related to each
other, i.e., in terms of social structure.
Such concepts as "level of integration of political units,"
"alienation of a class of individuals," or "pattern-maintenance
functions of an institution" are clearly understood as correlates of
particular relations among individuals although they are rarely
defined on those relations. This is presumably because analytical
techniques are not as highly developed in these disciplines. The
situation would be different if such properties are deduced from
the recorded patterns of interaction, from organizational charts,
from flow-diagrams, or from a graph of possible telephone connections from networks of interpersonal communication. To explain social behavior in terms of the relations among individuals
or among societal units presupposes that the relations of interest
are explicitly identifiable in relevant data, and not merely inferred
from their presumed behavioral consequences.
The kind of data that would contain evidence about the way
individuals, groups and organizations are related satisfies the following requirements:
(1) There are many distinct sets A,B ....,Z of observations.
(2) Each observation may be described in terms of (classified
or scaled along) one or more dimensions, i.e., A C IIxe,
B C IIxf, . . . , Z C IIxm •
(3) One or more kinds of many-valued relations R are specified
among the observations, e.g., Rl (a,b,c), R2 (a,b,c, ... z).
( 4) Some relations imply other relations, e.g., Rl (a,b,c,d) ~
Ra(a,c,d).
For lack of a better term, I call these data network data.
A kinship system provides a good example of what network
data may contain. Individuals may be described in terms of sex,
age, maturity, etc. But of crucial importance are such relational
attributes as lineal, colineal and ablineal descendent, and generational differences. It is the relationships which usually determine
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the kind of interpersonal interaction that may emerge and how
kinsmen perceive themselves as related. The way A is related to
B usually implies how B is related to A and delineates, to some
extent, how A and B behave toward each other. Adequate data on
kinship would have to exhibit which relations are equivalent and
which relations between A and B and between A and C imply
which relations between B and C.
The wayan organization analyst may chart lines of authority in
a bureaucratic institution is another example of the use of network
data. Observations regarding the scope of each office's supervisory functions and the formal and informal channels of influence
connecting the individuals involved yield relational nets, typically
hierarchies, from which, among other things, the possible paths
of a command may be deduced. That A's direct authority over B
and B's direct authority over C often implies A's indirect authority
over C again exemplifies the implications inherent in network
data. Recently Friedell [14] described organizations as semilatices using data from Street Corner Society as examples. He thus
made use of a way to represent many valued dependencies as a
hierarchy of relations.
In the study of communication processes, the mapping of networks is basic. Lasswell's question "Who says what to whom
with what effect?" requires at least a relational answer. The
practice of answering it as if it consisted of several independent
questions seems linguistically legitimate but eliminates the crucial
relational aspect of communication. When it is said that A communicates with B who in turn communicates with C, a transmission chain is identified. When, in addition, C communicates with
A, a transmission loop is described. The use of digraphs in diagramming complex communication nets is common [18] even
though the mathematical implications of this approach are not
always utilized.
I should like to add that graphical representations of networks,
e.g., using digraphs, are often misleading. Simply because it is
difficult to connect more than two modes with one arrow, such
descriptions readily suggest that relations between sources and
receivers, for example, are exclusively binary in character. If a
number of communicators coordinate their activity in a certain
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way, the resulting relation among them may not be describable
in binary terms. Tertiary relations (involving three individuals),
quaternary relations, ... , n-ary relations are difficult to visualize
and present even more serious problems of analysis.
The important analytical task of manipulating network data is
therefore a decomposition of many-valued relations into relations
of a lower order [5]. Systems analysts talk about hierarchical
decomposition [31]. Quantitative notions of the relative independence and density of a network, but more important, such
mathematical properties of relations as symmetry, transivity and
reflexivity provide powerful analytical devices for the decomposition of network data.
Suppose we observe a large group of individuals at a social
gathering. Unless highly institutionalized forms of behavior exist
-such as at a public speech-it is very unlikely that interaction
patterns involving, say, lOOO individuals need to be recorded.
Perhaps the order of the manifest relations does not exceed twenty
at anyone point in time and relations that are persistent during
such a gathering may not involve more than five individuals.
Without any doubt such a finding would constitute a tremendous
saving of subsequent analytical and conceptual efforts. Similarly
does the web of a city's telephone connections look umnanageably
complex to an alien. However, if the calls between any two stations are found not to be conditional on a third, then the apparently complex network can at once be decomposed into a set of
binary connections. It is precisely when communication is nearly
absent, such as among the drivers of cars, among people being
interviewed in isolation from each other, or among the members
of large mass media audiences, that mere aggregational properties
appear significant.
Relational biology, on the other hand, has shown that organic
functions often constitute an irreducible complex of mutual conditionality. If the connection between a parr of organs is interrupted, the whole complex may collapse. Mutual conditionality
is also the essence of organization [3]. To treat social organizations as if they were fully decomposable-for example by
interviewing each individual member-may miss their unique
properties. Whether and the extent to which a many-valued
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relation can be decomposed, i.e., whether such a relation can be
considered as an aggregate of lower order relations, should not be
a matter of a priori decisions. Data themselves must provide the
answers.

Relation to Aggregational Data
The possibility of decomposition links aggregational data with
network data. Aggregational data can always be interpreted as
a collection of distance~or ordering-relations between pairs of
points, i.e., as a collection of either one or another kind of binary
relation. Thus, if an elaborate network can be fully decomposed
into a set of binary relations with a metric interpretation and if
the values (individuals, stimuli, etc.) of these relations are drawn
from not more than two. distinct sets, then, in this special case,
network data and aggregational data are equivalent. Formally,
aggregational data are a special case of network data, the latter
being informationally richer and, as far as their explanatory potential is concerned, more powerful. This can already be seen as
implied by their formal definition.
Often the underlying network of communication caunot enter
the data because of .( a) experimental constraints, (b) limited
observational schemes, and (c) methodological biases. In gathering sociometric choices, for example, it is the experimental setting
which precludes network data from emerging. While filling out
the forms, communication among individuals is not permitted.
Assurances to subjects that individual choices will not be disclosed to members of the group is another way of suppressing the
emergence of higher order "choices." The fact that sociometric
choices among known friends tend to correlate, shows that the
method has considerable face validity. But it should be pointed
out that one essential property of social structure is that choices of
friends, or perceptions of social proximities and the like tend to be
mutually conditioned. Such a conditionality is reflected in the
possibility that A's choice of B-if communicated to C-will affect
C's choice of D. This is already a quaternary relation which
simply cannot emerge because the experimental setting systematically suppresses communication.
Another factor which prevents higher-order relations from ap-
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pearing in data are pDwerless observation schemes. Bales [6]
again demonstrates this point. The constraints which members of
a freely interacting prDblemsolving group mutually impDse upon
each Dther are simply ignored except where they affect binary
relations Df the type "A asserts C to B." Subsequent analysis Dften
reduces these binary relatiDns, of which Bales differentiates 16
different kinds, to properties associated with individuals. Thus
even the minimal relational content of aggregational data is eliminated.
Shaw's [30] review Df inquiries into communicatiDn networks
within small groups reveals how methodDlogical biases can obscure evidence about the effects Df higher-order communication
patterns. In this research tradition communication links among
individuals are manipulated so that the effects Df a variety of
channel configurations on group behavior can be studied. However, since traditional methods do not readily provide descriptive
devices for such networks (other than mere verbal designatiDns
in such terms as "chain," "wheel," and "Y") researchers seek to'
quantify and regard as a variable the properties of the nodes Df
such networks. Experimental evidence tends then to' be cast in
terms Df correlatiDns among the individual's centrality, peripherality, saturatiDn, and independence and many-valued channel
cDnfigurations which the experiments utilize are discarded to
cDnform to' established methDds Df analysis. (It is interesting to'
Dbserve that the experimental design Df communication networks
has by and large restricted itself to' communication among five
but nDt mDre than six individuals. This is mDst prDbably due to'
the fact that the number of pDssible communicatiDn patterns is an
exponential function Df the number of individuals invDlved. As
the number Df individuals increases, computational requirements
quickly spiral beyond the SCDpe Df current analytical techniques.)
AlthDugh analytical techniques fDr netwDrk data are not as well
known as those for aggregational data, they are not altogether
absent. In general, such techniques tend to' be qualitative, i.e.,
algebraic and logical, rather than statistical. Qualitative techniques can be as conclusive as statistical Dnes. Recent advances
in the algebra Df relations and in the computability of hierarchical
representatiDns, e.g., in terms Df list structures, permit symbDlic
manipulatiDn Df complex netwDrks without toO' much loss Df detail.
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The Use and Limitations of Network Data in
Communicatio1l8 Research
As I argued above, the notion of communication always implies
a relational component: a message is sent from A via B to C.
Interaction among individuals is understandable largely in terms
of the stable relationships that have developed among them [35].
The question must therefore be raised as to whether or not communication processes can be detected in network data. Unfortunately, the answer is negative.
If communication patterns are recorded as networks, there is
nothing peculiar in the properties of communication relations that
could not be found in entirely different domains. For example,
the binary relations "A talks to B," "A likes B," "A signifies B," and
"A is smaller than B" are all formally identical as far as
their anti-symmetry is concerned. What makes the first of these
relations one of communication is not its formal property, but its
semantic interpretation. There is very little in network data that
would permit the analyst to differentiate a communication pattern from a family tree, a work schedule or a graph of functional
requirements as used in architectural design [1]. While being
informationally richer than aggregational data, network data are
still not powerful enough to represent the formal properties of
communication processes.
This inadequacy of network data is quite obvious. It stems
from their static nature. Relations either hold or do not hold and,
when a number of "time slices" are summed, relations may be
said to occur with a certain frequency. Clearly, a representation
of this kind does not provide implications along the time dimension as the notion of a process requires.
Relations such as "A dominates B," "A supports B provided that
C supports A" or "A,B,C, and D trade with each other cyclically"
often are the reflections of underlying communication processes.
As in the case of aggregational data, network data may represent
correlates of communication processes (the outcome of interpersonal communication or the contractural result of bargaining) but
not the process in which such relations may have evolved. Although it cannot be ignored that such data may aid intuition
about communication or serve as a particular abstraction, there is
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no way to explicate and analyze processes of communication on
the basis of network data alone.
ELEMENTARY· COMMUNICATION DATA

Formal Requirements on Content
Mter having shown that aggregational data and network data
obliterate the very properties which constitute the target of inquiries into communication processes, I will now tum to a more
positive argument and point out at least the minimal formal
requirements which communication data must satisfy. This restriction to "minimal formal requirements" is dictated by the well
known fact that analytical and conceptual efforts quickly spiral
into unmanageable proportions once all conceivable intricacies of
communication processes are considered.
An abstract statement of these formal requirements is not too
difficult:
(1) All requirements of network data must be satisfied.
(2) Three-or-higher-valued transformations, T, involving time,
are specifiable oyer at least two distinct sets of configurations, Rn (describable in terms of network data), e.g.,
T(Rl X RZ)t-l = (Rz)t.
First, there must be identifiable in time and space two or more
component parts of a system. The individual members of a small
group, the organs of a complex organism, but also the components
of a modem electronic computer might be interpreted in these
terms. Each component may be described geographically (as occupying a certain space) and chronologically (along a time dimension) by the set of states it can take or by the possible configurations
it can receive, memorize or emit. A description of each of these
configurations, pattern, structures, etc., remains essentially within
the power of network data as discussed above.
Second, the component parts and consequently the system as
a whole should possess dynamic properties jointly and of their
own. Relevant data must have the potential to exhibit an orderly
variation of states, a regularity or some predictability along the
time dimension. Therefore, one important analytical task is to
identify some constraint over the succession of states and describe
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it as a transformation or as a set of possible transitions of one
configuration at one point in time into another configuration at
some later point in time. Just as we say that an individual goes
through a sequence of behavioral routines that are in part culturallyprescribed or psychologically motivated, so may the behavior of a social organization be described as a changing pattern
of more or less coordinated activities involving many individuals.
The delivery of a speech clearly involves a sequence of bodily
gestures and linguistic pattern and the visible behavior of a
newspaper are the configurations of print together with their
semantic interpretations that are turned out in regular intervals.
However, a behavior that could be depicted by transformations
of the form:

Rt - 1 -7 Rt
is of little interest to communication researchers. It would be
equivalent to describing the behavior of closed and whole systems
without reference to their components. If such a transformation
could be isolated successfully, communication is irrelevant as a
construct. Communication processes are conceptually linked to a
conditionality of behavior across the components of a system and
communication data must exillbit at least three-valued transformations. More specifically, if R is the repertoire of possible
inputs or the set of receivable message configurations, M is the set
of internal states or memory configurations, and E is the set of
outputs or emittable message configurations, then the kind of
three-valued transformations that may be deduced from data
could have the form:
and
(R X M)t-l -7 E t
The former characterizes a change in the internal state of an
individual regardless of what he emits. This may correspond to
attitude change or, more generally, learning. The latter describes
his emission as a consequence of both his previous receptions and
his state of memory or cognition. Individuals often talk without
external stimulation and change their minds without overt changes
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in behavior. There may not be any statistical correlation between
input and output, or between stimulus and response. Transformations of the above form can account for such facts. However, they
still have little to do with communication processes. They merely
characterize behavior as an open system as it has been studied
extensively under the name of automata theory [17, 24, 25, 34].
But automata theory is heavily geared toward synthesis while its
analytical component if not as highly developed. Progress can be
noted, however, in its application to linguistic theory [9, 10].
According to our definition of communication data we require,
thirdly, that such data provide the basis for deciding whether or
not structure is transmitted among the component parts of a system. Communication always involves a coding of patterns of one
form in one medium into another form of another medium. The
most common technical example is the translation of visual images
into electrical impulses, radiowaves, movements of an electrode,
and ultimately back into visual forms. This is quite analogous to
the process of transforming mental configurations into verbal expressions and back into cognitive structures. Such a transmission
does not require exact replication: the translation of the script for
a play into a performance may be regarded as a transmission
process just as the transfer of technology from one domain of
application into another constitutes such a process regardless of the
media involved. Communication has to do with the transfer of behavior patterns, decoding and encoding of linguistic structures,
and reproduction of cognitive configurations, but communication
also involves time and may involve delays, autocorrelation, "chunking," and conditioning, i.e., communication channels may exhibit
memory as one of several other characteristics.
We can thus regard the input to the communication process as
the emission, and its output as the reception, of each component
part of a system. If the memory or channel characteristics of the
process are denoted by C, the transformations for which evidence
is to be sought then has the following form:
(El X E2 X '" En X C)t-l ~ C t

and
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where E denotes emissions, R denotes receptions and subscripts
designate the communicators involved.
A formal comparison of the transformations accounting for the
behavior of each of a system's parts with the transformations
representing possible communication processes reveals them to be
formally equivalent. Both pairs describe processes of information
transmission. The former describes such process within, the latter
across, the communicators. Both can be treated by the same
analytical techniques.
This surprising isomorphism, visualized in Figure 3, suggests
that from a mathematical point of view the distinction between
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Identification of behavior and transmission in communication data

individual behavior and the communication process is quite arbitrary. Just as individuals are said to be linked by a communication
net, so can it be said that the communication net is closed by
the individuals concerned. The distinction is merely conceptual
and often leads to chicken-egg-type problems. Together both constitute one system the understanding of which seems to me to be
the aim of communication research.

The Form and Analysis of Communication Data
In order to provide evidence about the existence and nature of
the transfonnations which I have delineated, data must be recorded so that (a) the sequence of states of the system as a whole
can be examined in their chronological order. In addition, (b) a
diachronical differentiation must be made among at least two sets
of configurations corresponding to the states of at least two components. While communication data may have several different
forms, the easiest way to understand such data is as a protocol [4],
or as the tape of a Turing Machine with many channels, each of
which contains information about the states of the communication
agents involved, their emissions and their receptions.
The task of analyzing minimum communication data then becomes one of ascertaining whether or not some constraint on the

Krippendorff: Adequate Communication Data

263

possible succession of states can be demonstrated to exist across
the components of the system over time. This is the obverse to
saying that the task is one of testing for whether or not interaction
among the individuals exhibits some regularity over time or is
rule-like. If such a constraint can be shown to be present in data,
then some transformation, some explanatory device, might be
formulated to account for it.
Klir [21] visualizes the domains and ranges of the possible
transformations by means of a mask with windows defined over
the protocol entries as in Figure 4. Such a device covers those
states or configurations which the analyst does not wish to consider and makes relevant configurations available in its openings
for inspection. As the protocol is moved to the left, those configurations over which orderly variations are expected or transformations are sought become successively available.
Klir's work centers around the problem of describing the behavior of the system as a whole. The domain and range of the
transformation to be sought is then defined over any possible
set of windows of the mask. However, when evidence about the
existence or nonexistence of communication is to be extracted
from the protocol, the configurations of interest are. those that
might be transmitted across and processed within each component.
Figure 4 depicts two masks. The one labeled "behavior" exposes those configurations that are relevant to describe the
behavior of one component of the system (e.g., a hypothesized
communicator). It makes available for analysis the messages he
receives, his particular memory configurations and the subsequent
configurations of emission. The arrows correspond to those of the
three-valued transformations discussed above. Unless some constraint on the co-occurrence of states in E 1 , Rl and Ml can be
demonstrated to persist over time, there is little sense in trying to
describe the process by a transformation or as information processing.
The mask labeled "transmission" exposes those configurations
that are relevant to describe processes of transmission among the
.components suspected to communicate. This includes the messages that each individual emits at time t-1 (the input into the
communication net), the memory states of the channels, and the
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configurations of each individual's receptions (the output of the
communication net). The arrows which connect the windows'
openings of this mask likewise correspond to the arrows used
above to define the many-valued transformations. If a constraint
on the possible co-occurrence of states on the emission side and on
the reception side can be shown to persist over time, then evidence
for the existence of communication is provided, interaction is present, and information is transmitted. To account symbolically for
such constraints across communication agents, to describe their
dynamic conditionality as interactions, or to specify the transmission process as a transformation requires additional analytical
efforts with which I cannot deal within the limits of this paper.
A realistic example requires at least three-dimensional transition
tables that are too large to make the constraint we are seeking
easily recognizable and might still be an oversimplification. But
oversimplification is necessary here to make the point. Let me
therefore merely use a few more words in place of the symbols.
Suppose we observe a two-person telephone conversation and
we have a protocol consisting of state descriptions of

El = his emissions
E2 = her emissions
Rl = his interpretation of her emissions
R2 = her interpretation of his emissions
Ml = his internal states
M 2 = her internal sta.tes
c= the "memory" characteristics of the channel.
The emissions may consist of linguistic expressions, gestures, and
sound not all of which are transmitted through the channel. These
emissions are interpreted by the receiving individual (and monitored by the source). The internal states of the individuals may
be described in terms of emotions, a.ttitudes, conceptions of self
and the environment or as cognitive states of mind.
If communication between the two individuals is present, then
one should expect that his emissions are in some systematic way
related to her interpretation of his emissions and vice versa. Here
one does not need to require a perfect reproduction of the message
configuration sent; any distortion or misunderstanding will do as
long as it is systematic. Often though, the receiver's interp'l'eta-
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tions are inaccessible, in which case we have to identify communication in the conditionality that his verbal behavior imposes on
her verbal behavior at some later step in time and vice versa.
Communication must also be regarded as evident when conventions and inter-individual relations are established in the course of
the interaction according to which subsequent interpretations and
emissions are regulated.
Communication cannot be considered evident, for example,
either when he gives everything that she says the single interpretation: "nagging" and responds to his singular interpretation
regardless of the variation her verbal behavior exhibits, or when
his interpretations of her speech are entirely erratic, random and
in no way constrained by what she says. In such a situation we
would expect that all triples in

(E2 X Ch-l X C t
and in

(E2 X C)t-l X (R1)t
and/or all quadruples in

(E2 X C)t-2 X (M1)t-l X (E1)t
would be observed freely. Any constraint on the occurrence of
such m-tuples across individuals must be regarded as evidence
for the existence of a process of communication from her to him.
Communication in the other direction can be considered by
analogy.
This example should be interp'reted with the intended generality in mind. A protocol may describe many more such variables
for suspected communicators which in turn may represent biological organs, people, social institutions, or machines. The
reliance on an abstract mathematical formulation prevents such
generalities from becoming vacuous.
The importance of decomposing the transmission processes
involved must be emphasized. If not all messages reach each of
the possible destinations, or if information circulates only within
subgroups of individuals, a considerable simplification may be
achieved. Similarly, when interactions are only two-way (as
in an idealized telephone conversation) the system may be decomposed into independent systems involving pairs.
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By regarding communication processes as an open and dynamic
system of messages, analysis of data can determine whether or
the extent to which such processes exhibit "a life of their own" or
possess "super-individual characteristics." This is often said to be
a property of communication among men and a defining criterion
for social organization but it has to my knowledge never been
demonstrated. Inadequate data have so far prevented presentation of evidence to support such contentions.
I have restricted my argument to the form of minimal communication data. While more sophisticated data need to be considered
in order to provide interesting insights about communication processes, they cannot exclude the basic form I have discussed.
CONCLUSIONS

1. This classification of three types of data js not exhaustive.
Finer differentiations along more dimensions are necessary. However, in order to examine their methodological implications for
communications research such a division is sufficient.
2. Neither aggregational nor network data are powerful enough
to provide explicit evidence about the existence and nature of
communication processes. This does not mean that such data are
totally useless. Their use in communication research may supplement existing intuitions about communication and can provide
evidence about certain marginal phenomena and correlates of
the process. But the defining characteristics of communication
can neither be detected in such data nor can the analysis of
parameters of communication be based on them.
3. This fundamental insufficiency of data in communication
research accounts for several current conceptual problems associated with communication. On one hand, social problems that
press toward solution seem to nourish questionable ontolOgical
claims and dogmatic assertions. Questions regarding what is
communication are often settled by philosophical arguments
(e.g., a thing is what it is) or they are answered by reference to
an authority in communication (he knows what communication is
and what it is not). On the other hand, exclusive reliance on
inadequate methods of investigation leads to the impoverishment of the frnitful concept of "communication process" to the
kind of concepts for which such methods can provide explicit
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evidence. Thus, in the case of aggregational data, communication
is often studied as a variable, 01' at best as statistical association
between variables. In the case of network data, communication
reduces to a static pattern of relationships or to a fixed symbolic
structure. Consequently, the concept of communication is
stripped of much of its potential explanatory power.
4. One must realize that the major stumbling block in advancing knowledge about social communication is not the small
quantity of research that is being done in the field. In fact, if data
are not powerful enough to represent relevant parameters of the
process, and/or analytical techniques are inadequate to the phenomenon under observation, no increase in the number of studies
can possibly be expected to produce a breakthrough. What is
needed is an extensive development of computational techniques
for processing communication data. Fostering such developments
should be a prime target of the social communication sciences.
5. The fact is pointed out that more and more data archives
are emerging in the social sciences. The way· data are recorded
and made available to future users significantly determines what
will one day be studied and what may be discovered. Unless
meaningful proposals for the storing and manipulation of communication data are presented, communication research may
severely constrain its potential contribution to knowledge.
6. We have, I think, to admit the discomforting fact that our
current knowledge of communication processes hardly stems from
the explicit findings of research. It is our intuitive participation in
human interpersonal communication that has provided the primary source of current insight. Intuitive knowledge of this kind
tends to enter the semantic interpretation of research results surreptitiously. We know very little about how to describe and
reproduce communication processes symbolically or simulate them
on a computer. Methods that would provide explicit evidence are
scarce and techniques to control such processes in the real world
are almost completely unreliable.
It is hoped that this article was able at least to point to some
formal obstacles to progress in communication research. It depends on many creative minds to overcome them once they are
identified as such.

268

The Journal of Communication, Vol. 20, September 1970
REFERENCES

1. Alexander, Christopher. Notes on the Synthesis of Form. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964.
2. Allport, Gordon W. "The Open System in Personality Theory." In
Modern Systems Resem'ch for the Behavioral Scientist (Edited by Walter
Buckley). Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, 343-50, p. 345.
3. Ashby, W. Ross. "Principles of the Self-Organizing System." In Principles of Self-Organization (Edited by Heinz von Foerster and George
W. Zopf). New York: Pergamon Press, 1962, p. 255-78.
4. Ashby, W. Ross. An Introduction to Cybernetics. New YC'rk: John
Wiley, 1963.
.
5.
. "Constraint Analysis of Many-Dimensional Relations." General Systems 9:99-105,1964.
6. Bales, Robert F. Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study
of Small Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950.
7. Barton, Allen H. "Bringing Society Back In: Survey Research and
Macro-Methodology." American Behavioral Sciemist 12(2): 1-9, 1968,
p.1.
8. Blumer, Herbert. "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable.''' American
Sociological Review 21:683-90, 1956.
9. Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957.
10. Chomsky, Noam and George A. Miller. "Introduction to the Formal
Analysis of Natural Languages." In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. Vol. II (Edited by R. Ducan Luce, Robert B. Bush and Eugene Galanter). New York: John Wiley, 1963, p. 269-321.
11. Coombs, Clyde H. A Theory of Data. New York: John Wiley, 1964.
12. Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political
Communication and Control. New York: Free Press, 1963.
13. Ervin-Tripp, Susan M. and Dan 1. Slobin. "Psycholinguistics." Annual
Review of Psychology 17:435-74, 1966.
14. Friedell, Morris F. "Organizations as Semilatices." American Sociological Review 32:46-54,1967.
15. Gerard, Harold B. and Norman Miller. "Group Dynamics." Annual
Review of Psychology 18:287-332, 1967.
16. Gerbner, George. "Toward a General Model of Communication."
Audio-Visual Communication Review 4(3):171-99,1956.
17. Gluschkow, W. M. Theorie der Abstrakten Automaten. Berlin: VEB
Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1963.
18. Harary, Frank, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright. Structural
Models. New York: John Wiley, 1965.
19. Hovland, Carl. "Effects of Mass Media of Communication." In Handbook of Social Psychology (Edited by Garner Lindzey). Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 1062-104.
20. Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral
Science. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964, p. 187.

Krippendorff: Adequape Communication Data

269

21. Klir, Jiri. "Processing of General System Activity." General Systems
12:193-98,1967.
22. Krippendorff, Klaus. "Values, Modes, and Domains of Inquiries into
Communication." Journal of Communication 19:105-33, 1969.
23. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of
a Social Behaviorist. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1934.
24. Mealy, G. H. "A Method for Synthesizing Sequential Circuits." Bell
System Technical Journal 34:1045-79, 1S55.
25. Moore, E. F. "Gedanken-Experiments on Sequential Machines." In
Automata Studies (Edited by Claude E. Shannon). Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 129-53.
26. Newcomb, Theodore M. "An Approach to the Study of Communicative
Acts." Psychological Review 60: 39:3-404, 1953.
27. Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci and Percy H. Tannenbaum. The
Measurement of Meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.
28. Rogers, Everett M. DiffUSion of Innovations. New York: Free Press,
1962.
29. Sears, David O. and Ronald P. Abeles. "Attitudes and Opinions." Annual Review of Psychology 21:253-88, 1969.
30. Shaw, Marvin E. "Communication Networks." Advances in Experimental Psychology. Vol. 1 (Edited by Leonard Berkowitz). New York:
Academic Press, 1964, p. 111-47.
31. Simon, Herbert A. "The Architecture of Complexity." General Systems
10:63--76,1965.
32. Singer, J. David. "Data-Making in International Relations. Behavioral
Science 10:68-80, 1965.
33. Tannenbaum, Percy H. and Bradley S. Greenberg. "Mass Communication." Annual Review of Psychology 19:351-86, 1968.
34. Turing, A. M. "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the
Eutscheidungs Problem." Proceedings of the London Mathematics Society 42:230-65, 1936; 43:544, 1937.
35. Watzlawick, Paul, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson. Pragmatics of Human Communication. New York: Norton, 1967.
36. Wiener, Norbert. The Human Use of Human Beings, Cybernetics and
Society. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950.

